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Abstract 
 
Many scholars of Chinese soft power commonly believe that despite the fact that 
China has been working hard to achieve successful soft power expansion, one of the biggest 
factors that leads to Chinese soft power deficit or failure of the Chinese government to 
effectively trump “China threat” is its inability to use its cultural industries as a tool to fulfill 
its soft power expansion goals. This is a major obstacle to China in achieving its goal of 
successful Chinese soft power expansion, as it is said that culture is the most traditional and 
powerful source of soft power expansion. This paper, through its exploration of a specific 
cultural industry of China – its film industry – and China’s failure to use it successfully as a 
tool of soft power expansion, will strive to find out what is inducing this failure in order to 
produce a concrete lesson that China can take away to tackle its soft power deficit issue. This 
phenomenon in which China is unable to achieve successful soft power expansion through 
films is an interesting outlier case, for films are viewed by scholars as one of the most 
“powerful” cultural tools of soft power expansion (Lovric 2016). Through looking at the case 
studies of Japan and South Korea of how their film industries have granted them successful 
soft power expansion, and by comparing these cases to the unsuccessful case of China and its 
film industry, this paper will argue that the barrier to the Chinese government’s soft power 
expansion achievement through its film industry is not the government intervention in itself, 
but the fashion in which the CCP intervenes: in the form of censorship that discourages 
creative content from flourishing in a bottom-up fashion (due to its historic and present view 
of films as medium of spreading political propaganda). This leads to the overarching 
argument of this paper that: although cultural industries like films have the capacity to serve 
as powerful tools of soft power expansion, governments should note that a condition to this 
success is that cultural industries should be encouraged to develop organically from within 
the society rather than in a top-down fashion with heavy governmental involvement in the 
form of censorship.  
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Introduction 
 
Joseph Nye, the coiner of the term soft power, argues that in the current world, a 
country would not survive solely with its “economic and military assets”, and that it has 
become necessary for countries to expand their soft power – to pay attention to and strive for 
a positive “world opinion” of their images (Nye 2008, 96). China, through the course of its 
rapid economic development and becoming widely recognized as a new global superpower, 
has become one of these countries that has realized the increasing need to improve its global 
image – away from being portrayed as being authoritarian, corrupt, and lacking in human 
rights consciousness, to being recognized as a legitimate and influential nation worthy of 
respect. The Chinese government’s explicit statements regarding its commitment to 
consolidate a better image of itself through soft power expansion efforts can be traced all the 
way back to Mao’s regime in his Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, but were declared 
more formally in recent years within Hu Jintao’s “proposal of ‘peaceful rise theory’ and 
‘harmonious world’”, and even more explicitly within President Xi Jinping’s speech in 2014, 
when he announced that the Communist Party’s goal is to “increase China’s soft power, give 
a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s messages to the world” (Cho and 
Jeong 2008, 459; Shambaugh 2015, 99). China’s efforts to adopt and apply this idea of “soft 
power”, or “软实力 (ruanshili)”, to boost its image domestically and internationally took 
many forms over the years; however, according to many scholars, China is said to be 
currently experiencing a soft power deficit, not seeing favorable survey poll results done 
among different populations in several countries which asked how people thought of China 
(Shambaugh 2015). There are scholars with differing viewpoints on Chinese soft power, but 
they commonly believe that one of the biggest factors that leads to Chinese soft power 
expansion deficit, or the Chinese government’s failure to trump the notion of “China threat” 
is its inability to use cultural industries. This is detrimental to Chinese efforts to expand soft 
power, for culture is viewed as the most traditional and powerful source of soft power 
expansion (which countries that are seeking to achieve successful soft power expansion like 
China should resort to using).  
 
This paper will thus explore the specific case of how China’s films are bringing about 
soft power deficit in China, and pose the question of why, despite the fact that film is said to 
be “one of the most powerful cultural tools in communicating social messages to the public, 
as well as influencing politicians and government all over the world”, films made in China 
only bring about negative spotlights to the country (Lovric 2016). In fact, most successful 
films in foreign countries that could be often mistakenly known by the public to have been 
“made in China” have actually been made in Taiwan or Hong Kong, outside of Mainland 
China.1 For instance, the famous Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon that earned nearly $200 
million over the world is the product of Director Ang Lee - who is from Taiwan (Cain n.d.). 
Kungfu Hustle, Drunken Master, and The Forbidden Kingdom - these are all products that 
were created outside of Mainland China, in Hong Kong. Another example in which 
successful Chinese cultural movie that was made outside of China is the Kung Fu Panda 
series made by DreamWorks Animation in US, which earned around $1.3 billion 
internationally; in fact, the CCP officials were impressed by the faithful traditional Chinese 
values put forth by Kung Fu Panda series, leading them to talk with Jeffrey Katzenberg, the 																																																								1	The question of whether Hong Kong and Taiwan belongs to China is a separate debate that this paper does not 
engage in; however, they are both in fact considered as Autonomous regions with different economic and 
political systems from that of Mainland China, and are considered to have cinema industries that have 
developed separately and are thus distinct from that of Mainland China. 	
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Chairman of DreamWorks to set up a joint venture in the future (Cain n.d.). This is why, 
some people like Robert Cain, an entertainment consultant who works in China, argues that 
“China's best hope for improving its global image will be to enlist outsiders—storytelling 
mercenaries, or modern-day de Toquevilles, if you prefer—to shine a light on that nation's 
best, brightest, and most universal values” (Cain n.d.). However, it is important to consider 
that when representation of China is done continually by foreign sources, the resulting soft 
power is at risk of unsustainability and misrepresentation. What’s more is, when China does 
actually get its own films out to the foreign markets, the outcomes are not successful; 
Chinese government’s political narrative or visions that are embedded within Chinese films 
come off as rather tacky, responded to with negativity by foreign audiences – even the ones 
that are co-produced with foreign producers and directors. Some recent films created by 5th 
Generation directors like Zhang Yimou has gained attention in the international film 
community, but these are all movies that were critical of Chinese government and society, 
worsening Chinese image around the world rather than boosting Chinese soft power.2 Overall, 
it is fair to state that China does not have an iconic cultural industry that it can use as a 
resource to fulfill its soft power expansion goals, like Hollywood of US, Bollywood of India, 
or animation films of Japan, despite the fact that there is in fact a huge demand for Chinese 
cultural products internationally (Li 2009, 145). 
 
This paper will delve into case studies of Japan and South Korea - countries that 
experienced successful soft power expansion through their film industries. From looking at 
the Japanese and South Korean film industries’ historical developmental processes, the paper 
will look at how their governments were heavily involved in censoring films in the past, but 
have slowly changed to being less or indirectly involved; whereas in the case of China, the 
government’s view of film industry as a means to preach party values in the past continues to 
this day. Such fashion in which the Chinese government interferes into its film industry 1) 
causes lessened artistic autonomy that ultimately hinders the development of an original 
Chinese film industry “brand” that can be marketed sustainably, and also, 2) leads to even 
those films that actually make it to foreign box offices to be responded with negativity - as 
their containment of political values diminish their artistic values and likeability. By 
comparing the successful Japanese and South Korean cases of soft power expansion through 
film industries to the unsuccessful case of China, the paper will argue that the Chinese 
government’s barrier to successfully converting and using its film industry as a tool of soft 
power expansion is not the government’s intervention itself, but the ways in which the 
Chinese government intervenes into the film industry: in the form of censoring the films at 
their creation stage. From this finding, the paper will go back to the bigger picture of Chinese 
soft power deficit as a whole, and argue that if the Chinese government truly wants to achieve 
successful Chinese soft power expansion, it needs to realize that although cultural industries 
have the capacity to serve as powerful tools of soft power expansion, the condition is that 
they need to be developed more naturally from within the society rather than in a top-down 
fashion with the government’s heavy involvement in the form of censorship.  
 
Literature Review 
 
The literature review section of this paper will look at existing literatures on soft 
power and Chinese soft power, and how many scholars regard culture as one of the most 
traditional and powerful source of soft power that countries like China should use (rather than 																																																								2	Fifth	Generation	directors	are	a	group	of	rebellious	directors	who	challenged	the	Chinese	government’s	ideologies	with	politically	provocative	films.		
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economic or political leverages), but also, how many of these scholars claim that China is 
failing to use its cultural industry due to the ways in which the Chinese government interferes 
into the cultural industries. The literature review will convey the value of this thesis then: that 
through its exploration of a specific cultural industry of China – its film industry – and 
China’s failure to use it successfully as a tool of soft power expansion, this thesis will try to 
provide a concrete causal factor to Chinese soft power deficit that the Chinese government 
can take away as a lesson to tackle its soft power deficit issue.  
 
Soft Power’s Most Powerful Source (Culture) & China’s Inability to Use it Successfully 
 
According to Joseph Nye, soft power is the power of “attraction and seduction”, and 
the “ability to shape the preferences of others” without having to use hard power sources like 
economic payment and military intimidation (Nye 2008, 95). Joseph Nye had stated in his 
work that soft power of a country rests on three sources: “its culture (in places where it is 
attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its 
foreign policies when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority” (Nye 2008, 
96). Out of these three sources, Nye focuses heavily on the first source– culture – in his 
works; for instance, he describes the United States as a “democratic” country that “was a 
relative latecomer to the idea of using information and culture for the purposes of 
diplomacy”, but that its eventual attention to expanding soft power through spreading US 
culture has allowed it to become one of the most powerful countries in the world (Nye 2008, 
97). In the case of China, Zhao Qizheng amplifies the powerfulness of culture as a source of 
soft power expansion by stating “China cannot become a cultural superpower until China has 
a sufficient market share in the world’s culture market. Only when China becomes a cultural 
superpower, it is possible for China to be a world superpower” (Li 2009, 145).  
 
According to Li Mingjiang, Chinese leaders do recognize such need for China to 
focus on cultural exports, and are ambitious to become a major cultural exporter, because 
they are aware that that cultural exports can help the promotion and dissemination of Chinese 
culture while counterbalancing US’s cultural dominance, which will lead to the enhancement 
of Chinese soft power, which will then, “increase China’s comprehensive power in the 
world” (Li 2009, 144-145). Li also points out that there is in fact “a vast market demand for 
Chinese culture in the world”, and that China does have the “many cultural resources to 
become a major world power” (Li 2009, 145).  
 
However, despite such supposed readiness of the Chinese government to export 
cultural products and the desire among foreign countries to import them, many scholars point 
out that the Chinese government, instead of focusing on cultural products, uses its 
intimidating economic and political leverages as a tool of soft power “via initiatives like the 
enormous ‘One Belt, One Road’ program”, and by investing in overseas infrastructure 
projects that could simultaneously “increase its economic reach while also bolstering its 
image” (Ford 2017). To look at the sheer extent of the Chinese government’s economic 
investment into its soft power expansion efforts, it has been reported that “China contributed 
$50 billion to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank upon its founding, $40 billion for its 
Silk Road Fund, $25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road, and another $41 billion to the New 
Development Bank (established by BRICS states: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa)” (Albert 2017). One of the most well known critics of such Chinese soft power 
strategy, David Shambaugh, states in his work that “for all the billions of dollars China is 
spending on these efforts, it has yet to see any demonstrable improvement in its global 
image”, and that in fact, “the country’s reputation has steadily deteriorated” according to 
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public opinion surveys and polls (Shambaugh 2015,107). He explains the reason behind the 
failure is that “Chinese government approaches public diplomacy the same way it constructs 
high-speed rail or builds infrastructure – by investing money and expecting to see 
development”; he points that in order to carry out successful soft power, the Chinese 
government has to recognize that “soft power cannot be bought. It must be earned” 
(Shambaugh 2015,107). In fact, scholars like Shambaugh, Kurlantzick, and Nye himself, 
point out that the ways in which the Chinese government uses its economic leverages as a 
tool for soft power results in blurring of the lines between hard and soft power, leading to its 
soft power deficit problem (Ford 2017; “China Is Spending Billions to Make the World Love 
It: Can Money Buy That Sort of Thing?” 2017; Nye 2015; Kurlantzick 2007).  
 
On the other hand, some scholars also point out the limitations within these existing 
literatures; Michael Barr argues there are fundamental limitations to the claims within those 
who argue that China’s definition of soft power includes economic and political leverage and 
that such particularity of Chinese soft power strategy is the very reason why Chinese soft 
power is going to be unsuccessful. Barr targets Kurlantzick directly in his literature, saying 
that while Kurlantzick argues that “China has expanded the definition of soft power beyond 
Nye’s original meaning” by including economic and political leverages as well, Kurlantzick 
“curiously gives no references for his assertion, even though there is a veritable explosion of 
literature on soft power in Chinese”; in other words, Barr argues that “claims that the Chinese 
themselves define soft power to include coercive economic measures” put forth by scholars 
like Kurlantzick and Shambaugh “do not stand up to the evidence” (Barr 2011, 17-18, 
Kurlantzick 2007). Furthermore, Barr goes on to state “if one seeks to subsume hard and soft 
power so that coercion is now part of soft power, then the utility of the concept is so badly 
tarnished that it becomes of little analytical value” (Barr 2011, 18).  
 
It is true that the very concept of soft power should be differentiated from hard power, 
and Barr’s idea (that it seems as though some scholars might be willing to flex the definition 
of soft power to view Chinese actions as “threats”) evokes the actuality of the degree of 
acceptance for “China Threat” discourse that exists in academia. Byambakhand Luguusharav 
complements Barr’s point of view that “soft power lies in the soft use of power to nurture a 
state’s attraction, persuasiveness, and appeal” – and that this distinction must be kept clear; 
“if culture, ideology, and values are utilized for coercion, these cannot be counted as ‘soft 
power’, even though their associating sources are ‘soft’” (Luguusharav 2011, 6-7). Shogo 
Suzuki also agrees, stating that in the case of Chinese soft power, many scholars fail to make 
successful distinctions between Chinese government’s use of soft power and hard power, 
perhaps motivated by their underlying acceptance of China threat theory (Suzuki 2009).  
 
However, beyond this debate (of whether or not Chinese government’s use of “hard” 
sources should be counted into its efforts of soft power expansion), what these literatures 
commonly hint that in order for China’s soft power expansion efforts to be successful, China 
has to “tackle the international community’s concerns about China head-on, and explain why 
the Chinese system has its merits, where the country is headed, and why China is not a threat 
to others”, and that in order to do this, it should resort to culture as its main source of soft 
power expansion rather than economic or political sources (Zhao 2015). However, it is 
alarming to know that in the case of China, many scholars say that there seems to be soft 
power deficit caused by China’s very inability to make use of its cultural sources (Lovric 
2016, 31).  
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For instance, Kingsley Edney states that “China’s soft power strategy in the cultural 
sphere has always suffered from the tension between the twin objectives of appealing to 
foreign audiences and ensuring that what is being presented does not deviate from the party 
line. At least in the short term, for many in the cultural industries the incentives to conform 
are likely to outweigh the desire to push creative boundaries” (Edney 2016) Scholars like him 
believe that Chinese government causes its own soft power deficit problem by interfering in 
wrong way into its cultural sectors, such as education. An example of an effort made by the 
Chinese government in its culture-education sector is how it started promoting Chinese 
language and culture through constructing Confucius Institutes (which are “nonprofit 
organizations affiliated with China’s Ministry of Education” that “provide Mandarin 
languages courses, cooking and calligraphy classes, and celebrations for Chinese national 
holidays”), establishing 500 of them in total around the globe by April 2017 (Albert 2017). 
This was originally viewed as a smart move that could have contributed a lot to China’s soft 
power expansion efforts; however, scholars now state that teaching Chinese culture through 
such institute “can win only so much goodwill” if the Chinese government continues to 
intervene into the Confucius Institutes in inappropriate ways that attract controversy and 
antagonize its neighbors. For instance, Mcmaster University in Canada has discontinued its 
ties to the Confucius Institute program following an incident in 2013 over its employee being 
prohibited to follow Falun Gong, which is a forbidden religion in China; in another case, the 
head of Confucius Institute from China had ordered during a European Chinese-studies 
conference held in 2014, for programme including Taiwanese educational program to be 
“ripped out” (“China Is Spending Billions to Make the World Love It: Can Money Buy That 
Sort of Thing?” 2017). In both of these controversial cases, what was hindering the Chinese 
government was its own inability to let go of its need to intervene in its cultural industries - 
carrying out censorship measures through the Confucius Institute. Because such efforts of the 
Chinese government to expand soft power through its culture has been failing, scholars like 
Bruno Lovric go the distant of stating that, in China, “the most powerful resource – culture, 
has been somewhat ignored” (Lovric 2016, 32).  
 
Conclusively, it can be deduced from looking at these existing literatures that China’s 
inability to use its culture is a big barrier to its soft power expansion goals as a whole, as 
culture is viewed as the best source of soft power that the Chinese government is advised to 
use. Thus, by studying a specific cultural industry of China – its film industry – and striving 
to find out why the Chinese government is unable to successfully use it to achieve its soft 
power goals through its film industry, this paper will be able to propose a concrete lesson for 
the Chinese government that it can take away to solve its soft power deficit issue.   
 
Introduction to Case Studies: Film And Soft Power 
 
Film is said to be “one of the most powerful cultural tools in communicating social 
messages to the public, as well as influencing politicians and government all over the world” 
(Lovric 2016). Joseph Nye, a former US Assistant Secretary of Defense and the original 
creator of the term soft power himself, states in his early work surrounding soft power of US, 
that exporting of Hollywood films have in fact contributed greatly to the consolidation of 
positive global perception and attraction towards US over the years (Nye 2008, 95). Similarly, 
Daya Kishan Thussu, a Professor of International Communication at the University of 
Westminster in London and the Founder of the Sage journal Global Media and 
Communication, writes in his work surrounding the soft power of India, that the globalization 
of the country’s popular Hindi film industry have served successfully as an instrument of soft 
power expansion for India (Thussu 2016). Although some scholars state that soft power 
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expansion through popular culture has its limitation in that it does not foster a “serious” 
cross-border dialogue and is often carried out in a one-sided projection system, popular 
cultural products like films are nevertheless harmless and light-hearted forms of 
entertainment that have the capacity to appeal to people of all social classes and backgrounds, 
able to serve as an incredibly effective tool for countries to brand themselves (Iwabuchi 
2015). In fact, how countries that realized such usefulness of popular culture diplomacy has 
committed time and money to promote these industries – such as in the case of Japan’s “Cool 
Japan” project that signifies its aspiration of becoming a cultural superpower, or the case in 
which huge amounts of funding and even a president speech was dedicated to the distribution 
of K-pop cultural products in South Korea – show that film industry is an important tool of 
soft power expansion that countries like China should focus on using (Iwabuchi 2015; Kim 
and Dal 2016).  
 
This section will look into the case studies of Japan and South Korea specifically, of 
how their film industries have successfully granted soft power expansion to these countries, 
and use the observations gained from these case studies to make comparison with the 
unsuccessful case of China and its film industry to understand as to what is acting as a barrier 
to China’s case. These two countries were picked because they are China’s neighbors that are 
said to have “paved” a “path” for China to follow in terms of their successful cultural exports 
cases; the animation films of Japan and K-dramas/movies of South Korea that have created 
enormous fandoms across the globe and have allowed foreigners to develop interest in 
cultures of these countries that they might have not even have traveled to or heard of 
beforehand (Keane 2010; Y. Kim 2013). 
 
Japan  
 
Arguably, the most well recognized case of successful soft power expansion among 
Asian countries is Japan and its cultural industries. More specifically, Japan’s animation and 
manga films and television shows have boosted the nation’s image and brand internationally. 
It was stated all the way back in 2002 that: 
 
"Japanese culture has transcended U.S. demand or approval. Director 
and actor Takeshi Kitano, arguably the Japanese film industry's most 
noteworthy recent export, was first embraced in Europe, then in the 
United States. At…Berlin Film Festival, Hayao Miyazaki’s Spirited Away 
became the first animation feature ever to win a top festival prize. A 
major publishing show in Frankfurt, for the first time, opened an 
exhibition of Japanese manga” (McGray 2002, 46). 
 
 Douglas McGray continues to point out that Japanese success through film and 
television industry have resulted in other countries’ products drawing “heavily on Japanese 
anime and manga for inspiration”, able to be recognized in Hollywood films and popular 
television series, such as The Matrix, Ghost In Shell, Death Note – conveying vividly how 
Japanese film industry has successfully granted Japan with soft power, for it has led people 
from other countries to become naturally attracted to Japanese art, wanting to imitate what 
Japan is putting forth (McGray 2002, 46).  
 
 In the past, the Japanese government had heavily censored its film production 
process; the Film Law of 1939 (which was inspired by and thus resembled Nazi’s Film Law 
of 1934) required all filmmakers to undergo stringent processes to create and distribute 
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movies, such as having to pass “aptitude tests” designed by the government to remain in their 
film professions, and getting approvals on all of their scripts from the government prior to 
shooting so that the government could determine whether they were politically appropriate 
(Kitamura 2017). The intensity of government censorship in the film industry peaked 
especially high during the imperialist era, when the Japanese government wanted filmmakers 
to create “cinema of the national population” that could “reinforce the Japanese government’s 
expansionist agendas” (Kitamura 2017). 
 
 Stringent policies continued until mid 1990s, but these censorship measures started to 
gradually diminish, as the Japanese government, after its defeat from WWII, wanted to erase 
its image as an intimidating military power, and instead, to promote its soft power. The 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to realize the soft power potential in its cultural 
products, and initiated the “Cool Japan” project, in which government funds were set aside to 
help Japanese companies investing overseas (especially in cultural industries) to “explode 
Japanese attractive goods and services on a worldwide scale” (“Cool Japan Initiative” 2014). 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared formally that it aims to use “pop-culture, in addition 
to traditional culture and art, as its primary tools for cultural diplomacy” and “further the 
understand and trust of Japan” worldwide – organizing and supporting events like Japan 
International Manga Award, Anime Ambassador project, and the World Cosplay Summit 
(“Pop-Culture Diplomacy” 2017).  
 
Nowadays, the film and television production market of Japan is described to be 
“non-regulatory and very competitive” (Sugaya 2004, 14). Unlike many other countries, 
Japanese film market does not even have a domestic film quota – which means that foreign 
films can compete freely with domestic Japanese films.  
 
Today, there is one organization that overlooks the cultural aspect of Japanese film 
and television products: the ACA (Agency for Cultural Affairs), and in 2003, The ACA had 
created the four basic principles of the Japanese film production: 1) “Film is a synthetic art 
involving literature, drama, music, art, and architecture”, 2) “Film is an entertainment for all 
ages”, 3) “Film will create intellectual property values in the age of Information 
Technologies”, and 4) “Film contributes to a mutual understanding of the world” (Sugaya 
2004, 9). These four principles convey that the Japanese government believes that their films 
should promote universally accepted and enjoyable Japanese culture around the world, which 
contrasts significantly from the agenda put forth by the past imperial government. Other 
government agencies also participate in the market, but they are said to be more concerned 
with the economic issues, and only one of them – The MPMHPT (The Ministry of Public 
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications) – technically has the job of 
regulating the content of cultural products (Sugaya 2004).  
 
South Korea 
 
 Another very well recognized case of successful international soft power expansion 
through cultural industry is South Korea and the rise of “Hallyu”, translated as the “Korean 
wave”. Joseph Nye himself had stated that South Korea has the resources for soft power 
expansion – “from fashion and film to music and cuisine” – and is successfully growing its 
soft power through using these cultural resources efficiently (Nye 2009). In the case of its 
film industry, South Korea has not yet been able to establish as unqiue of a niche brand (like 
that of Japan and its animation and manga films), but it is said that “Korea’s pursuit of 
indigenous movie blockbusters has turned it into an international producer and distributor of 
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localized global movies” (Lee 2011, 45). Movies like Old Boy, The Host, and Memories of 
Murder were recognized in international film festivals, and were even recreated in other 
countries (Rist 2004).  
 
 Another soaring cultural industry in South Korea very closely related to the film 
industry is its television drama industry, known internationally as the K-drama industry. 
Korean romantic soap operas and traditional historical dramas have become increasingly 
popular over the world, penetrating its neighbors like China, Japan, Thailand, and Taiwan, as 
well as European, Middle Eastern, Latin American countries, and US (Y. Kim 2013). The 
South Korean dramas are also known to have generated income in other sectors of South 
Korean economy; for instance, the K-dramas are said to have “triggered a surge of Japanese 
tourists who toured sites depicted in their favorite shows” throughout the years (Lovric 2016, 
32). Both Korean films and K-dramas have also started to establish grounds on US-based 
online movie and TV streaming service like Netflix, and renowned South Korean director 
like Joon-ho Bong have created movies like the Snowpiercer and Okja that stars international 
celebrities (like Chris Evans and Tilda Swinton) that are watched by international viewers.  
 
 Similar to Japan, South Korean film and television industries were under heavy 
government control in its earlier days, characterized by national policy movies that preached 
the government’s political agenda; foreign film/television products’ entries, domestic 
products’ content, and distribution system were all strictly regulated under the government’s 
rule (M. Kim 2011, 177). Because of the strict content censorship, “it was difficult to produce 
movies that could be universally accepted”, which resulted in the failure of the government’s 
intention to boost the film industry” (M. Kim 2011). This period is marked as the Pre-takeoff 
Stage in the table beneath, in which the film industry of South Korea was at their earliest 
developmental state, not making much revenue at all.  
 
 
"Development Stage Division of the Film Industry in Korea " (M. Kim 2011, 177) 
 
However, the direction of governmental support started to change gradually; prior to 
1985, “films that reflected government’s goals (were) the object of support”, but after 1985, 
“films with artistic values have become the ones to receive support” (M. Kim 2011, 174). 
This push for creativity was caused by the “trend of globalization” and the following wave of 
deregulation policies, as the Korean government realized that regulations obstructed 
development of the domestic film industry (M. Kim 2011, 174). Some supporting policies for 
the domestic industry were set in motion as well, such as the educational support through 
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establishing Korean Academy of Film Arts (KAFA) which produced successful directors and 
producers, and financial support in forms of loans and investment that encouraged private 
investors to invest in the film industry (M. Kim 2011, 179). Brian Yecies and Aegyung Shim 
state that: 
 
“The Kim Dae-jung government’s (1998-2003) proactive support for the 
local industry without intervention, that is, without impeding the freedom 
of expression and creativity released after government censorship was 
eliminated in 1996, was critical to the changing face of Korean cinema… 
As a result, a new cartel of corporate/executive producers brought a 
ruthless efficiency to the industry by maintaining and fine-tuning the core 
elements of “high-concept” filmmaking, while generating new venture 
capital and ensuring accountability to their shareholder and customers 
(cinema audiences) rather than pandering to the whims of auteur 
filmmakers” (Yecies and Shim 2015, 254). 
 
This resulted in an unprecedented growth period of culture consumption known as 
Hallyu, or Korean Wave 1.0 - shown on the table above.3 The “big four” vertically integrated 
investor-distributors today are CJ E&EM, Showbox, Lotte Entertainment, and N.E.W., and 
they are the dominant players in the industry that collaborate closely with Ministries of 
Culture, Sports, and Tourism as well as Foreign Affairs (Yecies and Shim 2015). The film 
industry today became a competitive ground in which these powerful government-supported 
conglomerates all strive to produce film products that would be marketable to both domestic 
and foreign audiences. The Korean government also started to use its film and K-drama (as 
well as K-pop) industries “at the core of its cultural diplomacy and nation branding efforts” – 
which can be witnessed in the establishment of Council on Nation Branding, appointment of 
celebrities as tourism ambassadors, and in former President Park Geun-hye’s summit 
diplomacy that involved her participation in cultural events featuring in modern and 
traditional Korean culture whenever she visited other countries (Faure 2016).  
 
In conclusion, it can be seen in the case of South Korea that “indirect financial 
support and infrastructure support were more effective than direct financial support” (M. Kim 
2011, 179). The success of Korean films and television industry overseas now is a result of 
the South Korean government’s realization over time that strict regulations of contents 
obstructed development of the domestic film industry, and that the government should rather 
resort to indirect aids that boost the industry economically but still allow space for creativity 
to flourish from bottom-up. 
 
In both cases of Japan and South Korea, it can be seen that the government’s control 
over the film industry today have become very lenient compared to the past; government 
intervention still exists, but in the form of indirect financial aid that encourages the rapid 
dissemination of their cultural products abroad. In the case of China, as seen in the literature 
review section, the government’s intervention in itself has been criticized widely to be the 
cause of its soft power expansion failure, but from observing the case of Japan and South 
Korea, it can be seen that government intervention done in the right ways leads to 
enlargement of the countries’ soft power expansion potential (In the case of Japan, some 																																																								3	South Koreans often say that Hallyu is divided into 1.0 and 2.0, where the first part is when domestic market 
consumption increased, then latter as when the government realized the potential of the industries and started to 
market and export them to foreign countries.	
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scholars even point out that the Japanese film industry is on an unsuccessful path nowadays, 
and that this gloomy outlook is caused by its lack of more protectionist policies). So, it is fair 
to state that it is not the government intervention itself, but the method of government 
intervention employed by the Chinese government that must be at the heart of its film 
industry’s inability to expand China’s soft power.  
 
China & Its Films 
 
 From looking at the different case studies above, it is fair to state that China is an 
outlier in a sense that its entertainment industry, or specifically its film industry, because not 
only are films made in China unable to grant the Chinese government with successful soft 
power expansion, but also worsens the global perception of China and the Chinese 
government unlike the film industries of Japan and South Korea. Now, this section will look 
at the history of the Chinese film industry, and observe how the Chinese government has 
historically viewed the film industry as a means to preach party values to argue that the 
barrier to Chinese soft power expansion through films is the government’s intervention into 
the films in their stages of creation, which, 1) causes lessened artistic autonomy that 
ultimately hinders the development of an original Chinese film industry “brand” that can be 
marketed sustainably, and also, 2) leads to even those films that actually make it to foreign 
box offices to be responded with negativity - as their containment of political values diminish 
their artistic values and likeability.  
 
History of Chinese Film Industry 
  
The Chinese film industry was set up originally as a centralized, public institution, 
controlled under a “vertical management system extending from the central government to 
local administrations, with many administrative and regional barriers” (Su 2014, 99).  
It was in the 1980s-90s, as China gradually started shifting to private economy, when film, 
along with other popular cultural products, started to be produced for the sake of 
entertainment and profit with the loosened grip of the Chinese Community Party’s political 
agenda (Su 2014; Jihong and Kraus 2002). However, the process of lessening political 
control over popular cultural products is described to have been a slow process in China, 
especially in its film industry; “even after Party supervision began to slacken in areas such as 
painting exhibitions, book and magazine publishing, drama and music, the film industry 
remained (along with television) unusual among the arts in being subject to pre-production 
censorship, because the Party was “reluctant to loosen its grip on an important tool for 
propaganda” (Jihong and Kraus 2002, 421). The party, while carrying out economic reforms, 
had also simultaneously “decided to reemphasize the film industry’s propaganda value”, 
requiring studios to produce “major melody” films “centered around the mainstream Party 
ideology” - which were not responded with positivity among audiences (Jihong and Kraus 
2002, 422). At the same time, however, the Party had abolished most of the government 
subsidy system that had previously existed for the film industry that allowed, “even dull 
movies…an assured audience” (because the party used to buy group tickets to distribute to 
the workers) (Jihong and Kraus 2002). In summary, the economic reform of film industry 
done in a limited fashion not only made films that were still under heavy government control 
less competitive among other art industries that were given more space for creativity at the 
time, but also meant less economic security for the film industry compared to its old times 
when the government distribution system provided subsidies. These factors led to an 
unprecedented decline in movie attendance and ticket sales, causing severe financial crisis of 
the film industry; “in the first half of 1992 alone, the financial loss of state-owned film 
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studios reached 70 million Yuan, and 6000 film-business-related enterprises either closed or 
transitioned to other businesses” (Su 2014, 100).  
 
In efforts to revive its film industry, the Chinese government decided to start 
recognizing the market forces, and took measures to create better commercial films (Jihong 
and Kraus 2002, 422). First, the Chinese government abolished “state monopoly over 
distribution after 1993”, inviting non-state investment to the film industry which was now 
restructured by cutting off inefficient production groups and merging the rest into fewer, 
strengthened groups (Jihong and Kraus 2002, 422). Second, the Chinese government started 
importing Hollywood films in a controlled fashion (only 10 blockbusters annually) (Su 2014, 
100). Third, the Chinese government used the revenue collected from Hollywood movies to 
then “create a more attractive form of propaganda through a peculiar hybrid of political 
authority and market forces the updated major melody film” (Su 2014, 102; Jihong and Kraus 
2002, 429). These melody films were referred to as the “main melody” films (zhuxuanlu) or 
“excellent quality” films (jingpin), which the Chinese Film Bureau described as films that 
“unify education, art and entertainment” – or in another words, films that can be marketable 
and do well at the box office, but also fulfill the idea of “yiwo wei zhu, wei wo suo yong” – 
to “serve China’s needs and national interests and should be made muse of for China’s gains 
and goals” (Su 2014,101; Jihong and Kraus 2002, 430). The film studios, although were first 
cautious in creating films that were more liberalized from Party politics, after being 
encouraged by government officials, successfully created films that found “middle ground 
between official propaganda and commercial entertainment” (Jihong and Kraus 2002, 430). 
These new mainstream major melody films were able to gain popularity due to the 
filmmakers’ clever strategies of using well-known commercial celebrities that helped to blur 
the line between fun, accessible commercial films and major melody films (which were 
previously thought to be dull and unsophisticated); the characters’ background stories and 
struggles were also designed so that the audience could relate more to them – they were no 
longer directly preaching Communist Party’s political values, but embodied them in their 
altruistic and heroic actions (Jihong and Kraus 2002, 428).  
 
The Chinese government’s adoption of Hollywood-like marketing tactics of 
“bombarding audiences with newspaper reports, television advertisements and radio 
broadcasting” also helped to popularize the films, eventually leading to success of films like 
Not One Less or Leaving Lei Feng (Jihong and Kraus 200, 431). Although these reform 
measures taken by the government meant that Communist Party values were “toned down to 
fit a consumer-driven society”, it can be seen that the government still controlled the film 
industry to perpetuate its ideologies (Jihong and Kraus 2002, 432).  
 
 The noncommittal economic liberalization of the film industry was continued, as the 
State Administration of Radio Film (SARFT) and the Ministry of Culture issued documents 
in 2000s to allow foreign private capital to enter into Chinese film production, allowing them 
to establish studios and produce films in China, but there were also many restriction outlined 
for them; foreign film studios had to be jointly owned by a Chinese state-owned studio (with 
the Chinese counterpart having more power) (Su 2014, 103). This created a boom in the film 
industry as it created investment friendly environment for the domestic film studios, but the 
foreign investors and film studios were limited heavily – leading to transnational corporations 
like the Warner Bros. International Cinemas withdrawing from the Chinese market by the 
end of 2006 (Su 2014, 103-105).  
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It can be seen that since its very origin, the film industry of China has historically 
been viewed as a method to preach CCP’s political ideologies and expand its soft power of 
national cohesion domestically, and although the Chinese government brought about 
economic liberalization reforms over the years to create less political and more commercial 
films, it still has control over the film industry and uses film as a medium of spreading party 
values.  
 
Chinese Government’s Intervention Into Its Film Industry – Continued  
 
To this day, the State Administration of Radio Film (SARFT) controls Chinese film 
industry very heavily; its “primary duty is to align art content with the state requirements and 
policies”, and it has the power to “request modification of film stories, change of plots and 
characters, as well as to revoke shooting permits or distribution rights” (Lovric 2016, 33). In 
November of 2012, Hu Jintao addressed the Party Congress with the following words: “To 
develop a strong socialist culture in China, we must take the socialist path of promoting 
cultural advance with Chinese characteristics. We should adhere to the goal of serving the 
people and socialism, the policy of having a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of 
thought contend, and the principle of maintaining close contact with reality, life and the 
people” (“Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress” 2012). At first, one will 
notice in this speech that Hu Jintao was trying to urge the domestic artists and writers to 
promote Chinese culture around the world; but when looking more closely, one will also be 
able to sense how the speech eerily echoes Chairman Mao’s Hundred Flowers Campaign.4 It 
is fair to interpret his statement as Hu Jintao trying to send an encouraging yet chilling 
message to the Chinese artists. This is contrasted highly from the case studies of Japan and 
South Korea, which showed that these two governments in the past had strict censorship 
powers over their film industry, but realized that gradually, their controls had to be loosened 
for the sake of boosting originality and creativity for their films’ market competitiveness.  
 
As Michael Keane states, “the overt pedagogical framing of much domestic content 
operates as a form of ‘cultural discount’ in regional markets. In other words, the political 
accent diminishes the value of the product”; this is reflected in the current state of Chinese 
films that are unsuccessful in the market (Keane 2010, 49). For instance, the movie Kung-Fu 
Yoga, starring Jackie Chan with Stanley Tong, who in the plot embark together on a journey 
to find the lost treasures in Tibet, has been widely criticized as being “overdose of cultural 
stereotypes” - a “mangled mess” (Bhushan 2017; McLean-Dreyfus 2017; Pulver 2017). 
Originally planned to be a joint venture project between China and India’s film industries that 
resulted from a co-production agreement signed by China and India in 2014, the film ended 
up being produced by the Chinese film company alone as the Indian company ended up 
pulling out of the project midway (McLean-Dreyfus 2017). The film was a success in China, 
now ranking as the third highest-grossing domestic films in China for 2017, but foreign film 
critics and audiences, especially those in India, responded with discontent and even anger. 
These sentiments are fair, as cultural misappropriations can be noticed from the title of the 
film itself, which angered journalists like Tanul Thakur from the Wire, who comments that 
the film reeks of “orientalism”, describing that the director and his crew of the film “look like 
the kind of people who come to India, pay for a ‘slum tour’, go back to their countries, 																																																								4	Hundred	Flowers	Campaign	was	a	liberalization	movement	carried	out	by	Chairman	Mao	in	1956,	which	encouraged	Chinese	people	to	openly	criticize	the	Chinese	Communist	Party;	the	campaign	was	halted	soon	after,	and	the	government	carried	out	an	Anti-Rightist	Campaign	and	cracked	down	on	those	who	criticized	the	government	earlier	–	sending	them	to	labor	camps	and	prisons.		
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patting themselves on the back, claiming to have understood an entire country” (Thakur 
2017). Some critics also noticed that there are “bizarre” scenes and dialogues that contains 
Chinese government’s propaganda, such as “when Chan’s character is asked by an official to 
“help the Belt and Road initiative”, a wide-ranging pan-Asian economic plan inspired by the 
Silk Road, which aims to consolidate China’s regional dominance” (Pulver 2017). This 
shows how “producers, such as animation ships, are charged first and foremost with the 
responsibility of educating the children of China and resisting the impact of foreign 
competition. The pleasures of the viewer and the profitability of the product must take a back 
seat to such concerns” (Keane 2010, 131). Also, the film starts out by everyone in China 
talking in English, as if the Chinese government wants to desperately portray that China has 
ascended to being an international nation. From looking at the harsh reviews of the film, a 
writer from East Asia Program at the Lowry Institute writes that “badged as an example of 
Sino-Indian film cooperation, Kung-Fu Yoga can also be viewed as part of China’s wider soft 
power strategy”, but “despite China’s best efforts to make its mark on the global film 
industry… global domination by the Chinese film industry is still some way off”, and “its 
soft power strategy is still in a nascent stage” (McLean-Dreyfus 2017).  
 
In the case of South Korea and Japan, their cultural products do contain historical 
contents, but are nonetheless popularly accepted, because their historical elements are not 
forcefully inserted into the plots by governments that lack objective outlooks on history or 
have goals to promote their political agendas. Looking at the case of South Korean K-dramas 
more specifically, Hannah Jun states in her work that in fact, “more recently, Korean dramas 
such as My Love from the Star (2014), Descendants of the Sun (2016) and The Legend of the 
Blue Sea (2016-2017) have included more fantastic or surreal elements, such as time/space 
travel and wartime plots, within a framework of Korean history” (Jun 2017, 155).  
 
Furthermore, in China, due to the state control over the film industry accompanied by 
stringent censorship measures, artistic autonomy is lessened, which results in lessened 
potential for more original and more sustainable Chinese film industry to be developed 
naturally. Now, China’s endeavors to revive its film industry has led to its recent success in 
finding a viable state-industry collaboration system in which the studios produces more 
marketable commercial major melody films; domestically, the Chinese government has 
indeed successfully revived its dying film industry this way and “grossed more than 6.5 
billion U.S. dollars in 2015 and are expected to top 11.9 billion by the end of 2017, which 
would propel China to overtake the U.S. as the highest grossing country in box office sales” 
(Rosen 2017). However, this success seems to be unstable, because it is sustained through 
copying of ideas and censorship of materials from other countries. In fact, China has been 
often criticized for blatantly copying South Korean shows; on social media, South Koreans 
have been referring to China the “copycat nation”, that “they cannot do anything but copy 
Korean art and entertainment”. Furthermore, while copying South Korean entertainment 
products, China started to ban them from entering China – a measure which was intensified 
even more after the THAAD incident – which has been angering the South Korean populous 
even more. This is not limited to South Korea, but also, US, as China continues to censor 
Hollywood films (Wang and Liu 2013). A Chinese movie executive commented that 
“Chinese movies have done well at the box office, and Hollywood has suffered”, however, he 
went on to state that “it is a not fair game”, since “Hollywood studios are only allowed to 
show 30 films a year or so, and they have to be distributed through China Film Group [the 
state distributor]. They cannot market their movies; they cannot even decide when they will 
be released. When the Superman movie came out, all that people knew over here was that it 
was an American film with special effects. No one had heard of Superman” (Moore 2013). 
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There seems to be an issue of China unable to create its original form of art that sells well in 
the market, and focusing its energy on blocking other entertainment products from entering 
its country. This is a prime example how China is often criticized for participating in 
“negative” soft power strategies rather than “positive” soft power strategies – how it does not 
focus on the actual positive soft power strategies of establishing and spreading its original 
cultural values, and instead, engages in the negative soft power strategies of censoring and 
criticizing other cultures to make its own look better comparatively (Callahan 2015).  
 
Another particularity of Chinese soft power that is significant to keep in mind here is 
how Chinese government’s soft power efforts are both inward (domestic) and outward 
(abroad). In her report about Chinese soft power and China’s soft power expansion activities, 
Sayama explains, “in China’s case, the government’s strategy and tactics are strongly 
associated with shaping Chinese society rather than publicizing its achievements” (Sayama 
2016, 2). Michael Barr complements this view by stating in his work that “…whilst many 
commentators in China are loyal to Nye’s definition and understanding of soft power, there is 
one key difference: in China, soft power is not limited to international image-building. 
Rather, its deployment is as critical at home within the country as it is abroad” (Barr 2011, 
28). Michael Barr points to the 117th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 
2007, when Hu Jintao announced that the “Party must enhance culture as part of the soft 
power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests”; 
here, Barr looks at how this statement demonstrates how domestically, China tries to use soft 
power to “promote national cohesion and creativity”, while internationally, it tries to use soft 
power to “strengthen China’s competitiveness within the international arena” (Barr 2011, 30, 
35). Barr argues generally that this particularity of Chinese soft power successfully brands 
China as a confident and unified nation led by a strong national government, but he also does 
believe that “there are obvious limits to this exercise”: 
 
“With one hand China promotes the values of diversity, peaceful rise and 
harmony. With another hand it controls access to social networking sites 
and detains anyone who questions the Party… These moves of raw state 
power inevitably harm Beijing’s own effort to promote a peaceful image” 
(Barr 2012, 83). 
 
Joseph Nye had also stated that “it is important to remember that the same words and 
images that are most successful in communicating to a domestic audience may have negative 
effects on a foreign audience” (Nye 2008, 104). The dual roles which soft power takes on in 
China is important to recognize because it supports my argument regarding how China has 
historically viewed film as a medium of spreading political propaganda – its soft power 
expansion - domestically, and fails to recognize that when keeping this view intact and 
continuing to censor films at their creation stage, its international soft power expansion 
through films is going to continue to fail (and its domestic success is highly unlikely to last 
forever as domestic film viewers are continued to be exposed to foreign products).  
Conclusively, what is acting as a barrier to China’s use of film industry as a soft 
power expansion is the Chinese government’s historical understanding of film as a 
propaganda, which results in its censorship of the films at its creation stage – ultimately 
resulting in low quality films that are not marketable to foreign audiences and even to the 
domestic audiences in the long run – implying its lessened potential to be used as a tool of 
soft power expansion. The Chinese government needs to discontinue its interference into the 
film industry in order to promote the development of original films that could be marketed 
	 Kim	16	
sustainably, as “telling authentically Chinese stories (instead of perpetuating hackneyed 
cultural clichés) is more likely to resonate with global audiences, ensuring both box office 
success and a genuine interest in Chinese culture. A freer and bottom-up approach to both 
film-making and soft-power propagation will allow China's cultural influence to rival the 
staying power of established soft-power countries” (McLean-Dreyfus 2017). The 
government’s hold over the film industry could “at least in theory, be used for altering films 
and improving the country’s image abroad; but in practice, such blatant instrumentalization 
of the national film industry comes at the expense of lowering film’s creative input, 
international credibility and the reduction of soft power potential” (Lovric 2016, 33).  
 
Conclusion 
 
David Shambaugh comments in a video about Chinese soft power that “soft power is 
like a country that is a magnet, that attracts others to you, others want to emulate you, they 
respect you, they value your… political system… In other words they want to be like you. 
That’s soft power. It comes from society. It does not come from the government” (Center for 
Strategic & International Studies). The Chinese government must recognize that the 
resources of soft power must arise naturally from the society, and that these resources 
something that is “organic” and inherent in the political or social culture of the country – not 
artificially created by the government (Center for Strategic & International Studies Nye 2015; 
Shambaugh 2015; Sayama 2016). Indeed, “What China fails to understand is that despite its 
world-class culture, cuisine, and human capital, and despite its extraordinary economic rise 
over the last several decades, so long as its political system denies, rather than enables, free 
human development, its propaganda efforts will face an uphill battle” (Shambaugh 2015,107).  
 
At this point, the outlooks for Chinese soft power expansion might look dim; 
however, China has in theory, a great potential to exert soft power due to its sheer historical 
existence and cultural background. Furthermore, from looking at the case studies of Japan 
and South Korea, it can be deduced that it does not mean that the Chinese government cannot 
interfere at all into its film industry. In fact, government interference done in the right fashion 
(focusing on indirect financial aid and on the distribution process) will benefit the Chinese 
film industry. 
 
In order for China to tackle the issue of its inability to use its films as a tool of soft 
power expansion, the Chinese government must recognize that innovation from the bottom 
up is essential. Although this will entail a long-term process, organic innovation that arises 
among Chinese artists will ensure genuine Chinese art to be disseminated across the world in 
a sustainable fashion, allowing Chinese nationals to represent and speak for their own culture.  
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